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Transnational Representation 
in EU National Parliaments: 
Concept, Case Study,  
Research Agenda
Lucy Kinski1  and Ben Crum2
Abstract
This article introduces the notion of ‘transnational representation’ to refer to claims by national 
parliamentarians on behalf of citizens of other national constituencies. Thus defined, transnational 
representation combines insights from the constructivist turn in the theory of democratic 
representation with a renewed focus on national parliaments as the prime institutional sites 
of representation. A focus on transnational representation advances the debate on democratic 
representation in an age of internationalisation in two ways. First, it allows for a systematic 
and comparative analysis of how representation in parliaments responds to internationalisation. 
Second, it suggests a new perspective on the possible alignment of political representation with 
the range of affected interests. We illustrate these two claims with a case study of transnational 
representation in parliamentary debates on the European Financial Stability Facility and by 
outlining an agenda for further research.
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Introduction
Late September 2011, the question whether to expand the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF), which was established to bailout Eurozone countries unable to service 
their debt, was put before the Austrian Lower House. Michael Schickhofer, parliamentar-
ian for the Social Democrats, contributed to this debate with the observation that:
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I quite frankly admit that this decision to agree to this rescue package is not easy, but we should 
briefly consider how the people in Greece are doing. There, too, are employees who have 
worked for many years, paid into the pension system and are now confronted with the fact that 
20 percent of the pensions are to be reduced. There are civil servants who have always remained 
in their country and who have been there for the people and are now being confronted with the 
idea that 30,000 to 40,000 jobs are to be cut […] (Michael Schickhofer, Social Democratic Party 
of Austria, Austria, EFSF Expansion, 30 September 2011).1
Based on these considerations, Schickhofer asserted that this decision ‘cannot be just 
about our own interests’ (emphasis in original) and eventually concluded: ‘I stand by the 
Austrian interests, but we must also think in terms of Europe and the people of Greece’.
This argumentation exemplifies how ‘standard accounts’ (Castiglione and Warren, 
2013; Urbinati and Warren, 2008) of political representation have come under pressure 
in an increasingly interdependent world as political representatives face a structural mis-
match between their electoral constituency and the people whose interests are affected 
by their decisions. Schickhofer’s statement contradicts the rationalistic conception in 
which political representatives vie for re-election by exclusively representing the 
national interest. Instead, he acknowledges a wider European collective interest, which 
includes the Austrian interest he has been elected to serve. What is more, he directly 
inserts the plight of the foreign citizens of Greece into the considerations that bear on the 
political position he adopts.
This article introduces the notion of ‘transnational representation’ to denote claims by 
national parliamentarians on behalf of citizens of other national constituencies. As illus-
trated by Schickhofer’s statement, transnational representation exploits the wedge between 
the constituency that formally authorises political representatives and the constituency 
whose interests these representatives may invoke. Our conceptualisation of transnational 
representation contributes to the empirical and theoretical literature on democratic repre-
sentation in an internationalising world and, in particular, seeks to reconnect the empirical 
analysis of parliamentary debates with recent theories of political representation. 
Empirically, we submit that the concept of transnational representation allows us to iden-
tify and demonstrate that national parliamentarians adopt this mode of representation and, 
in a more exploratory take, to suggest certain meaningful patterns in the way that they do 
so. Conceptually, we suggest that, by building on the dynamic and constructed nature of 
representation as an act (cf. Saward, 2010), the notion of transnational representation 
points to a distinctive conception of democratic representation in an ever more interde-
pendent world; one that does not rely on the establishment of overarching representative 
institutions but rather on networks of representative claims across national parliaments.
To achieve these aims, the article is structured as follows. The next section develops 
the concept of transnational representation, both in the context of recent constructivist 
theories of representation and in the specific context of democratic representation in the 
multilevel polity of the European Union (EU). In the section “Operationalising 
Transnational Representation and its Alternatives,” we develop an operationalisation that 
serves to identify transnational representation in parliamentary debates and distinguishes 
it from alternative modes of representation. Then, the section “Case Study and 
Expectations” presents the outlines of a case study in which we empirically investigate 
transnational representation as well as a set of expectations regarding its manifestation. 
The findings of this case study are presented in the section “Observing Transnational 
Representation during the Eurozone Crisis”. The final section reflects upon these findings 
and uses them to sketch a broader research agenda.
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Concept: Positioning Transnational Representation
Transnational representation involves national parliamentarians raising claims on behalf 
of citizens of other national constituencies. Defined as such, the concept contributes to 
three related, yet different debates in political science and political theory: representation 
theory, international democratic theory and democratic representation in the EU. First of 
all, transnational representation builds upon the constructivist turn in representation the-
ory. This turn highlights that political representation is a generative relationship that 
reflects the dynamic and open-ended nature of political decision-making (Disch, 2011; 
Urbinati, 2006). Thus, it fundamentally challenges the ‘standard account’ of representa-
tion (Castiglione and Warren, 2013; Urbinati and Warren, 2008), which focusses on the 
relationship between a constituency and a parliamentarian, who acquires the position of 
representative by being elected into office on the basis of a well-specified programme, 
and whose actions are driven by the prospect of re-election. As the most notable scholar 
of the constructivist turn, Michael Saward (2010) reframes representation as a ‘claim’ to 
underline how representation always remains contestable and depends on others to iden-
tify with it and to recognise its legitimacy – even if the claim does not speak for them.
One of the major merits of a constructivist approach to representation is that it does not 
fix the constituency that is being represented but allows for multiple and shifting constitu-
encies. This feature is essential to our notion of transnational representation as it relies on 
a distinction between two constituencies: one domestic that formally authorises the par-
liamentarians and holds them to account, and one potentially ‘foreign’ that the parliamen-
tarians invoke. This echoes Saward’s (2010) distinction between the ‘referent’ actor, on 
whose behalf a representative claim is put forward, and the ‘audience’ on which the claim 
is to have an effect. Even closer to our purpose, Laura Montanaro (2018) distinguishes 
between the ‘authorising’ and the ‘affected’ constituency. The authorising and affected 
constituency may coincide – and in traditional conceptions of representation, they often 
do – but this is not necessarily the case. Not only may one be bigger than the other, but 
also they can actually refer to different populations (Saward, 2010: 49–50). Coming back 
to the example from the introduction, while the Austrian electorate serves as Michael 
Schickhofer’s authorising constituency, the Greek people are prominently included in the 
affected constituency of his deliberations and vote.
This brings us to the second debate to which transnational representation speaks, 
namely the one on international or global democracy. Indeed, the constructivist approach 
is particularly fruitful outside the safe boundaries of the established practices of national 
representation, as processes of internationalisation challenge established understandings 
of constituencies. As the decisions that a nation state takes may have severe consequences 
beyond its jurisdictional boundaries, there emerges a much-noted misalignment between 
those authorising a decision within national boundaries and those affected by this deci-
sion (Koenig-Archibugi, 2017; Näsström, 2003).
Recognising the mismatch between national representatives and an increasingly inter-
nationalising world, the study of political representation has tended to turn away from 
elected politicians. Instead, it has broadened the concept of representation to include non-
elected actors who may be better positioned to speak on behalf of interests that might 
otherwise go unrepresented (Kuyper, 2016; Montanaro, 2018; Steffek et al., 2007). This 
move suggests that politicians’ perspectives are narrowed by the parochial concerns of 
their constituency and the games of everyday politics, and that it comes to civil society 
organisations, like Oxfam, and to celebrities, like Bono, to highlight how national politi-
cal decisions resonate far beyond national boundaries.
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In light of this literature, transnational representation appears as a more ‘traditional’ 
approach since it returns to the formal representative institutions of national parliaments. 
However, it is exactly the combination of a constructivist approach with formally defined 
and well-entrenched institutions that we believe to be particularly effective. On the one 
hand, transnational representation is located in the institutions of national parliaments, 
involving formally authorised parliamentarians whose status as political representatives 
is widely recognised (cf. Rehfeld, 2018). On the other hand, our constructivist approach 
does not take the representative status of national parliamentarians as self-evident but 
scrutinises their individual claims and differentiates between the different (represented) 
constituencies that these involve.
Indeed, the constructivist approach allows transnational representation to escape the 
assumption that requires the level of democratic representation to be formally aligned 
with the range of affected interests, and which often stifles current debates about democ-
racy beyond the nation state (e.g. Held, 1995; Koenig-Archibugi, 2017). That assumption 
essentially leaves two options: one in which public powers are scaled back to the national 
level to align with the best-institutionalised constituencies (cf. Dahl, 1999) and the other 
in which democratic institutions are scaled up to the international level to align with the 
affected interests (e.g. Falk and Strauss, 2001). However, neither of these options appears 
adequate in the face of the actual challenges of internationalisation.
Enter the third debate to which transnational representation directly contributes: dem-
ocratic representation in the EU. Here, it becomes clear that neither of these two options 
– realigning political power with national democracy or establishing a supranational 
democracy – are viable or desirable (cf. Bellamy and Castiglione, 2013). In the EU, trans-
national interdependence has become permanent and all-pervasive. As the Brexit process 
clearly illustrates, even if it may be possible to disentangle a nation state from the formal 
intertwinements, the practical spill-over impacts of policies and societal movements 
remain immense (see, for example, the contributions in Outhwaite, 2017). However, the 
opposite strategy of scaling-up democratic institutions by establishing a directly elected 
European Parliament has not been an unmitigated success either. Citizens continue to 
perceive EP elections as second-order elections, as turnouts remain far below national 
levels and have tended to fall even further over time (Schmitt and Toygür, 2016). More 
fundamentally, the EP as a ‘strong’ public remains detached from a corresponding ‘weak 
public’, a pan-European public sphere in which whatever representative claims are made 
within the parliament can be collectively contested (Eriksen and Fossum, 2002). Instead, 
public spheres remain mostly organised at the national level (Fligstein, 2009; Koopmans 
and Statham, 2010), which leaves national parliaments as the main focus points for public 
deliberation and, indeed, the main sources of political legitimacy.
It is exactly under the conditions where public power is exercised across borders 
while political identification remains concentrated at the national level, that transna-
tional representation may come in. The key is that transnational representation discon-
nects the act (and constituency) of representation from the act (and constituency) of 
electoral authorization. In other words, transnational representation acknowledges the 
position of national parliaments as the prime sites for representative democracy, but it 
highlights that this leaves parliamentarians the freedom to invoke constituencies with 
which they do not maintain a direct electoral relation. In this sense, transnational repre-
sentation refers to national parliamentarians raising claims on behalf of citizens of other 
national constituencies. This means it cuts across national borders, but at the same time 
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remains connected to national identities and has to be distinguished from supranational 
(or even global) representation that supersedes and replaces such identities (for a similar 
distinction cf. Angevine, 2017).
The concept of transnational representation builds upon previous studies that have 
demonstrated how internationalisation, and European integration in particular, allow par-
liamentarians new discretion in determining the kind of common good they appeal to. 
Studies of debates in national parliaments on the Eurozone crisis (Closa and Maatsch, 
2014; Wendler, 2016) have highlighted how national parliamentarians rely on different 
conceptions of the European common good, ranging from the purely functional to a deep 
sense of solidarity. Even closer to our approach, Lord and Tamvaki (2013) have demon-
strated how members of the European Parliament can vary the scope of the constituency 
they rely on as they intersperse references to a European common good with invocations 
of a national and, even, a global common good.
More broadly, the idea of transnational representation sits well with suggestions to 
conceive of the structure of democratic representation in the EU as a ‘multilevel parlia-
mentary field’ (Crum and Fossum, 2009) or a ‘Euro-national parliamentary system’ 
(Fasone and Lupo, 2016) that encompasses both national parliaments and the European 
Parliament. Such conceptions underline the multilevel and polycentric character of the 
structure of representation in the EU, in which the relations between parliaments remain 
underdetermined in constitutional terms and rather rely on informal processes of coordi-
nation and communication. In such a context, transnational representation emerges as a 
way to establish interlocking relationships between these parliamentary sites through rep-
resentative claims.
Operationalising Transnational Representation and its 
Alternatives
As indicated, empirically, we locate transnational representation in the context of national 
parliaments with a focus on the claims made by members of parliament (MPs). In doing 
so, we draw on Pieter de Wilde’s (2013) ‘Representative Claims Analysis’ (RCA) (cf. de 
Wilde et al., 2014, 2015). This method has been ground-breaking in combining Saward’s 
(2010) theory of representative claims-making with the empirical approach of political 
claims analysis developed by Koopmans and Statham, (1999, 2010). We follow de Wilde 
et al. (2014) by defining claims on the basis of necessary core elements. Thus, RCA 
avoids that entire speeches can be considered a single claim even while different issues 
and representative objects are addressed – something that was left open in the original 
political claims analysis. Also, we follow de Wilde in focusing the empirical analysis on 
what we can observe from the textual claim itself and from the status of the claimant. As 
this method thus takes the claims of the parliamentarians at face value, it offers a reliable 
way to code the core elements without seeking to assess their sincerity. 
However, we deviate from de Wilde in that we maintain Saward’s and Montanaro’s 
distinction between the authorising and the affected constituency (cf. Disch, 2015: 494). 
As we study transnational representation in the context of national parliaments, the 
authorising constituency can be equated with the national electorate that has formally 
authorised the national MPs as representatives through elections. With the authorising 
constituency given by the national status of the parliamentarian, the key variable in our 
analysis is the affected constituency of the claim and the way it is related to the 
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authorising constituency – what Lucy Kinski (2018) refers to as the ‘representative 
focus’. In this respect, we distinguish ‘transnational representation’, in which the affected 
constituency is external to the authorising constituency, from ‘national representation’, in 
which the two constituencies coincide. Furthermore, we distinguish a third possibility, 
which we label ‘supranational representation’ and which is of particular relevance in the 
context of the EU. Supranational representation involves claims in which the authorising, 
national constituency is included as part of an overarching affected constituency, typi-
cally something like the ‘collective European interest’ or the ‘European people at large’.
Concretely, whenever we encounter a representative claim, the mode of representation 
is essentially determined by two operational criteria: who is represented (explicit and 
positive reference to the affected constituency: national, transnational and supranational) 
and how are foreign interests referred to? These two tests allow us to identify transna-
tional representation as a distinctive mode of representation that involves political posi-
tion-taking on behalf of foreign interests and to distinguish it from the alternative 
– national and supranational – modes of representation (Table 1).
Purely national representation speaks for national interests only. Such claims either 
make no reference to foreign nationals or refer to them negatively. For example, a national 
MP speaks exclusively for her country’s national interest or her national electorate with-
out any regard to the grievances of foreign nationals. Alternatively, she may refer to 
another state’s interest purely as a constraint on her own representative room to manoeu-
vre. Transnational representative claims are distinguished from the former by the fact that 
they include an explicit and positive reference to foreign nationals. Specifically, these 
references are considered positive, whenever the claimant ‘speaks for or about’ (Saward, 
2006: 305) these foreign citizens. Speaking for foreign citizens, the claimant directly 
claims to represent their interests or shows herself accountable towards them. Speaking 
about these foreign nationals, claimants refer to their needs or problems, costs and bene-
fits, caused by a political action. Empirically, such representative claims can take differ-
ent shapes including the claim to ‘represent the interests of a person, […] to embody the 
needs of a group of people, to stand for the preferences of a country or a region’ (Saward, 
2010: 38). In turn, supranational representative claims refer to an overarching citizenry 
above the nation state. As in such supranational claims all concerns (national and foreign) 
are effectively subsumed under an overarching common good, the distinction between 
national and foreign citizens becomes obsolete. In sum, only in transnational representa-
tion, foreign citizens are represented in that the claimant actively and positively speaks 
for or about their concerns.
A further issue follows from the fact that even within a single claim we frequently 
encounter mixed references. Consider again the example from the introduction: while 
there is a clear transnational element in Schickhofer’s invocation of ‘how the people in 
Greece are doing’, he concludes by saying that ‘I stand by the Austrian interests, but we 
must also think in terms of Europe and the people of Greece’. In doing so, he essentially 







Affected constituency National citizens Foreign citizens Overarching citizenry
Foreign interest 
representation
None or negatively 
(external constraint)
Positive None (distinction 
obsolete)
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covers the whole sequence from national to supranational and transnational representa-
tion. To take account of such cases, we use two classes to operationalise transnational 
representation, a pure one and a mixed one. For the former, representation is transnational 
only if an MP positively and exclusively refers to foreign citizens in a representative 
claim (Pure Transnationalism). For the latter, representation is already transnational the 
moment an MP positively, yet not necessarily exclusively, refers to foreign citizens in a 
representative claim (Mixed Transnationalism). Our second measure adds to the pure 
transnational claims those that also refer to other modes of representation, be they national 
or supranational.
Case Study and Expectations
As a first exploration of the forms and incidence of transnational representation, we pre-
sent a case study in which we apply our conceptualisation to parliamentary (plenary) 
debates on the EFSF in the lower houses of parliament in Austria, Germany and Ireland. 
The EFSF as the first, ad hoc, Eurozone bailout mechanism is particularly suitable for this 
purpose because it was concerned with economic and political interdependence, with 
most of the debate focusing on the fate of ‘foreign’ countries. As these discussions have 
been politicised along national lines (cf. Maatsch, 2016), our sample includes parliaments 
from countries with varied positions in the debate, creditor (Austria and Germany) as well 
as debtor countries (Ireland), and a large country (Germany) as well as two smaller ones 
(Austria and Ireland).
Altogether, the three parliaments dedicated 11 plenary debates to the EFSF in 2010 
and 2011: three in Austria, four in Germany, and four in Ireland (see Online Appendix 1). 
The verbatim reports of these parliamentary debates were manually coded for representa-
tive claims according to the operationalisation presented in the previous section (see 
Online Appendix 3 for the codebook). This yielded 490 representative claims.2
In the next section, we present our descriptive, qualitative and quantitative findings on 
the occurrence of transnational representation among these claims. The case study 
emphatically involves only a first test of concept. Its main purpose is to demonstrate that 
transnational representation takes place, to illustrate the different forms it takes in prac-
tice and to get a sense of its place in parliamentary debates. Still, beyond qualitative 
illustrations, we want to show that, as a form of representative claims, transnational rep-
resentation allows for systematic and comparative analysis. Given the nature of this anal-
ysis as a case study, we limit ourselves to presenting some initial bivariate analyses of the 
prevalence of transnational representation across different parliamentary systems and dif-
ferent kinds of parliamentarians.
To structure these analyses, it is useful to explicate the kind of findings we anticipate. 
As regards the kind of parliamentary systems that we expect to be most hospitable to 
transnational representation in the context of the EFSF, two lines of explanation suggest 
themselves. The first line of explanation departs from the particular characteristics of the 
parliamentary systems involved. The main variable that we consider in this respect are the 
formal powers and strength that parliaments enjoy in EU affairs as it is commonly meas-
ured in the literature on national parliaments in the EU (Auel et al., 2015; Winzen, 2017). 
The underlying causal mechanism is that the more MPs are empowered to engage with 
EU affairs, the more we expect them to perceive and identify with the interests of other 
European peoples. We therefore expect transnational representation to be more prevalent 
in parliaments that are relatively powerful in EU affairs.
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A second line of explanation rather departs from the EU’s order as a whole and con-
siders the place of each parliament’s country within it. As the decisions of more powerful 
countries are more likely to have an impact on the citizens of others, one would expect 
their parliamentarians to be more prone to engage in transnational representation. In the 
context of the EFSF – and indeed in the context of the EU in general – the position of 
Germany stands out as it is the biggest and economically most powerful EU member 
state. Still, there is also a significant difference between Austria and Ireland, as the first 
ranked among the so-called ‘creditor’ states while Ireland became a recipient of the 
EFSF by the end of 2010. As that moment falls in the midst of our collected data (which 
cover 2010 and 2011), we can actually establish whether the change in Ireland’s position 
in the EFSF made any difference to its parliamentarians’ inclination to engage in trans-
national representation.
Turning to possible variations between parliamentarians, the critical question is 
whether we expect transnational representation to be genuinely motivated by a sense of 
transnational solidarity and interdependence or whether it is above all an instrument that 
is strategically employed in the political process to expose one’s opponents as morally 
deficient. This is not a question we can settle in the context of this analysis, especially 
since we only look at claims on face value and have no means to independently gauge 
parliamentarians’ intentions (cf. Markovits, 2006). Still, we can offer some cues by con-
sidering how transnational representation is structured between proponents and oppo-
nents of the EFSF, between government and opposition and along the party-political 
spectrum. We can expect transnational claims to be adopted both by supporters and oppo-
nents of the EFSF, albeit on rather opposing grounds. Proponents of EFSF support to 
Greece may rely on a sense of transnational representation to give wider moral credence 
to their position. Yet, given how contested the austerity conditions attached to the loan 
package were, one can also imagine opponents to appeal to the plight imposed on the 
people of Greece.
However, more compelling cues on the exact drivers of transnational motivation can 
be derived from whether or not one is associated with the opposition and from one’s 
party’s ideology. If transnational representation is merely a rhetorical tool for political 
posturing, then we expect its use to be mostly driven by the government–opposition 
divide, with opposition MPs invoking transnational representation to shame the govern-
ment (contra Kinski, 2018 on Europeanised representation). In contrast, if transnational 
representation is genuinely a reflection of parliamentarians’ sense of responsibility 
towards ‘foreign’ constituencies, we expect government opposition dynamics to be less 
relevant and ideological positions to be the main drivers of its use. In particular, we 
expect it to be more likely to occur among (certain) left-wing parties, which have a rather 
internationalist orientation (cf. Closa and Maatsch, 2014).
Observing Transnational Representation during the 
Eurozone Crisis
Analysing the 490 representative claims encountered in the 11 parliamentary debates, 
we find that, as one would expect, the vast majority (61.2%) of these claims involves 
pure national representation and exclusively refers to the national (authorising) con-
stituency (Table 2). Still, we identify 8.4% of all representative claims by Austrian, 
German and Irish MPs to be purely transnational, that is, positively and exclusively 
referring to foreign citizens’ concerns. When we add the ‘mixed’ representative claims 
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that have a positive and explicit transnational element but also include national and/or 
supranational references, the share of claims containing at least a transnational dimen-
sion rises to 21.2%.
Thus, approximately every fifth representative claim in the sample has a transnational 
representative dimension. While it is impossible to generalise from this particular debate, 
such a share is very much in line with indications from extant empirical research. For 
instance, in her study on women’s representation in the Belgian national parliament, 
Erzeel (2012: 38) finds 10% of representative claims by Belgian MPs to refer to women 
in foreign countries. Investigating representative pluralism in national parliamentary 
debate, de Wilde (2012) shows that national EU budget debates in Denmark, Ireland and 
the Netherlands feature representative references to other EU member states (9.4%) and 
even non-EU countries (17.0%). Finally, Kinski’s (2018) analysis of Europeanised repre-
sentation during Eurozone crisis debates uncovers that 39% of all representative claims 
have a Europeanised dimension, that is, at least include a transnational and/or suprana-
tional representative reference.3
When we consider the cases of transnational representation more closely, they clearly 
reflect how an issue like the EFSF calls upon MPs to consider interests that go beyond 
their national constituency. What is more, this awareness is not limited to those MPs that 
are most open to those foreign interests, as is illustrated by the case of Robert Lugar, a 
former member of the right-wing populist Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) who 
is an independent MP at the time of the EFSF debates. Lugar explicitly refers to the dif-
ferent modes of representation as the underlying dividing line between national MPs:
There is a difference of opinion about which people deserves our attention. There are parties in 
this House who believe that we are the people’s representatives in the Austrian Parliament and 
are therefore obliged to the Austrian people. And there are other MPs here who are spanning this 
a bit further and who also hold the European people dear to their heart. It may very well be 
legitimate if you think about Greece and Portugal and the peoples of these countries and if you 
do not want them to be hit by adversities (Robert Lugar, independent MP (former BZÖ), EFSF 
Expansion, Austria, 30 September 2011 (emphasis in original)).
Eventually, however, he concludes, ‘That is all: the interest of the Austrians because we 
are in the Austrian parliament, we are elected by Austrians and that is why we represent 
Austrian interests’. While Lugar thus determinately reverts to national representation, more 
generally we find that once MPs reference foreign interests, they are likely to recognise that 
Table 2. Modes of Representation during EFSF Debates.
Type of claim Total number 
of claims
Percentage Pure TR (%) Pure + Mixed 
TR (%)
National 300 61.2  
Supranational 55 11.2  
(Supra-)National 31 6.3  
Transnational 41 8.4 8.4 8.4
(Trans-)National 47 9.6 9.6
Trans-/Supranational 13 2.7 2.7
(Trans-/Supra)National 3 0.6 0.6
Total 490 100.0 8.4 21.2
EFSF: European Financial Stability Facility; TR: transnational representation.
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these should have a bearing on their decision-making and need to be somehow balanced 
against the interests of the national constituency. Such a balancing approach is for instance 
reflected in the argument of Michael Schickhofer cited in the introduction.
As we saw, 12.9% of representative claims combine transnational representation with 
another mode of representation. Indeed, transnational representation is the only mode of 
representation that appears more often in a mixed than in a pure (8.4%) form. While 
Schickhofer balances different national interests, we also find representative claims that 
challenge the priority of national identity and define their relevant constituency in terms 
of specific societal groups. A nice example of that comes from Sabine Leidig, MP, for Die 
Linke in Germany who submits:
We should not forget that there are also top and bottom in Europe. Employees in Greece are 
much closer to employees here when it comes to enforcing common interests (Sabine Leidig, 
Left Party, Germany, EFSF Expansion, 29 September 2011 (emphasis added)).
Leidig thus connects the interests of the Greek workers with those of the German work-
ers and opposes them to the elites in both countries. Interestingly, we find that members of 
the populist far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) also invoke a transnational class 
divide with a strong focus on ordinary citizens opposing a transnational economic elite:
Not a single Greek, not a single Greek citizen, will benefit from this [EFSF], not a single 
Austrian will have any advantage from it, but the gentlemen bank directors […] will be pleased 
because in reality you [the government] serve the banks with this. Ultimately, you again get the 
banks out of a tight spot, those banks that were busy speculating (Heinz-Christian Strache, FPÖ, 
Austria, EFSF Installation, 19 May 2010 (emphasis added)).
Once we turn to the variation between the three parliaments (Table 3), we find a notable 
difference between the German MPs, among whom we find the highest share of (at least 
partly) transnational claims in the EFSF debates at 28.4%, and their colleagues in Austria 
(20.5%) and Ireland (13.8%). Furthermore, from 2010 (setting up the EFSF) to 2011 (expan-
sion of the EFSF), the share of transnational claims increases in all three national parlia-
ments. This increase is most pronounced in Germany, while Ireland keeps the lowest degree 
of transnational representation in the sample and the highest share of purely national repre-
sentative claims (74% as compared with 59% in Austria and 53 in Germany).
On a first look, these differences seem indicative of the strong and prominent role that 
Germany played in these debates while Ireland found itself in a more peripheral and 
dependent role. Notably, zooming in on the change from 2010 to 2011, the share of trans-
national claims in Ireland did not increase much as the country went from being a creditor 
country to the EFSF to becoming a recipient from the end of 2010 onwards. One way to 
interpret this finding is to assume that, once crisis hits hard, MPs put their own constitu-
ents first. In that sense, transnational representation may well be a ‘luxury’ that is most 
affordable in countries that are economically healthy and can claim a prominent position 
in the international constellation. However, the rather consistent differences between par-
liaments also give credence to the suggestions that transnational representation very 
much reflects structural constants in the powers and predispositions of the parliaments. 
Indeed, the observed differences align quite well with the Austrian Nationalrat and the 
German Bundestag being institutionally strong parliaments and the Irish Dáil comparably 
weak in EU affairs (Auel et al., 2015: 79). Given that we only look at three parliaments 
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here, we cannot, however, conclusively answer what it is that drives the country differ-
ences we observe.
Turning to the different kinds of parliamentarians that engage in transnational repre-
sentation, we find that it is employed both to argue in support of the EFSF as well as 
against it. Typically, parliamentarians on the far-left appeal to the Greek people to justify 
their opposition to the EFSF by insisting that the instrument harms them. A nice example 
is the following:
As has already been mentioned, it is not the people responsible and those profiting from the crisis 
who are held to account – and that is a reason to vote against this bailout – but the whole thing is 
carried out at the expense of the majority of the population. I was shocked when I was in Greece 
a few weeks ago and talked to many people. Their living conditions are very difficult. Many feel 
humiliated by this policy, which is also driven by the German federal government. […]. I repeat: 
that is shameful. That is why I voted against the rescue package today. […] I support the demand 
of the Greeks, expressed on Syntagma Square in Athens. These people say: we need a 
comprehensive debt haircut for Greece; otherwise, there will be no future for our country (Heike 
Hänsel, Left Party, Germany, EFSF Expansion, 29 September 2011 (emphasis added)).
However, it is exactly this kind of argumentation and its underlying idea of solidarity 
that are challenged by German MP Jürgen Trittin, then leader of the Green parliamentary 
party group:
Dear Gregor Gysi [then Die Linke parliamentary party group leader], those who are for Europe, 
those who are for international solidarity, must not refuse an instrument today [EFSF] that 
serves to protect member states of the European Union from speculation on the financial markets 
(Jürgen Trittin, Green Party, Germany, EFSF Expansion, 29 September 2011 (emphasis added)).
The Greens’ criticism of the far-left opponents of the EFSF is shared by their col-
leagues from both left and right centre parties. In the end, however, the incidence of 
transnational claims is twice as high (30.7%) on the side of opponents of the EFSF as it is 
among its supporters (16.1%; Table 4).
This prevalence of transnational claims among opponents of the EFSF points to the 
importance of the difference between government and opposition (Figure 2). Naturally, 
MPs from the governing majority are committed to support the EFSF, as the fund was a 
common decision among the Eurozone governments by which they sought to ‘save’ the 
Member States in economic distress. However, we find that government MPs tend to rely 
on national or supranational claims (that rely on functional interdependence rather than a 
sense of solidarity), while transnational claims are much more often invoked by the 
Table 3. Share of Transnational Claims per National Parliament.
2010 2011 Overall
Austria 17.9 (7.1) 22.6 (3.8) 20.5 (5.3)
Germany 9.8 (6.6) 39.6 (21.8) 28.4 (16.1)
Ireland 10.8 (2.7) 14.9 (4.0) 13.8 (3.6)
Percentage of pure and mixed transnational claims; pure transnational claims between brackets. Strong asso-
ciation between national parliament and time with transnational claims (V = 0.25*** [p < 0.001] for both pure 
and pure + mixed TR, see also Online Appendix 5).
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opposition (Figure 1). Claims made by MPs who belong to the governing majority are 
about half as likely to exclusively refer to, or at least to include a reference to, foreign EU 
citizens as claims made by their colleagues from opposition parties.
Finally, to shed further light on the mechanisms underlying these patterns, we unpack 
the use of transnational claims at the level of parties, although the interpretation of these 
findings warrants some caution given the limited number of cases for some of the parties. 
When we plot the prevalence of transnational claims against the ideological distribution 
of political parties on the left-right scale (Figure 2), it turns out that, on average, the more 
right-wing a party is, the less likely it is for its MPs to engage in transnational representa-
tive claims. This relationship is significant and rather strong for both pure and mixed 
transnational claims combined (right-hand panel, correlation coefficient of −0.6*), while 
it is not significant for pure transnational claims only (left-hand panel). What is more, it 
is not so much the Europhile mainstream parties but rather Eurosceptic parties on the left 
Table 4. Transnational Representation and Voting on the EFSF.
Type of claim Claims by MPs who voted Total
 In favour Against Abstained  
Pure + mixed TR 16.1% (45) 30.7% (59) 0% (0) 21.2% (104)
Other 83.9% (235) 69.3% (133) 100% (18) 78.8% (386)
Total (N = 100%) 280 192 18 490
EFSF: European Financial Stability Facility; TR: transnational representation.
Cramer’s V of 0.20*** [p < 0.001] shows a moderate relationship between voting behaviour and transna-
tional representative claims making.
Figure 1. Transnational Representation Governing Majority – Opposition (in %).
V = 0.10* [p < 0.05] for pure transnational claims; V = 0.13** [p < 0.01] for pure and mixed transnational 
claims.
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(Die Linke in Germany and Sinn Féin in Ireland) that seem to be the main drivers of trans-
national representation in national parliamentary debates on the EFSF. As was already 
illustrated above, these parties invoke the plight of the Greek people to oppose the EFSF 
measures. Among the proponents of the EFSF, these arguments are countered by politi-
cians from the Green and Social Democratic parties who argue that the interests of the 
Greeks are best served by the bailout. However, more often than not, these centre-left 
MPs rely on national or supranational claims to justify their support.
Still, transnational representation is not the preserve of the left alone. For one, we find 
the populist FPÖ to be a noteworthy outlier on the right with a notably high degree of 
transnational representation. Austrian FPÖ MPs tend to refer to the ordinary citizens and 
the ‘little man in the street’ in a populist fashion but, surprisingly, they do not do so only 
with regard to their national constituency, but also include, for instance, ordinary Greek 
citizens when they go beyond national borders:
You [the governing coalition] splash € 22 billion, not a single Cent of which will arrive at the 
ordinary people in Greece. You know that as well as I do. Mr. Cap [then social democratic 
parliamentary party group leader] is already looking away, because the last remnants of his 
conscience are beginning to squeeze him (Herbert Kickl, Freedom Party of Austria, Austria, 
EFSF Installation, 19 May 2010 (emphasis added)).
The exceptional nature of this strategy is underlined by the fact that the BZÖ, the 
FPÖ’s then competitor on the populist right, does not engage in any transnational repre-
sentation but chooses to focus exclusively on the national constituency.
Figure 2. Transnational Representation Left-right Position (in %).
Left-right scaling based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2010 (Bakker et al., 2015).
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On occasion, centre-right politicians also make transnational claims, as is evidenced 
by this quote from one of the main protagonists of the handling of the Eurozone crisis:
We understand the problems in Greece. As I said in an earlier debate, reducing the deficits brings 
heavy burdens on the population that is affected. Nobody should talk about it with malice. 
However, if you incur too much debt for years, you cannot avoid adaptive measures (Wolfgang 
Schäuble, Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Germany, EFSF Expansion, 8 September 2011 
(emphasis added)).
At the same time, Schäuble’s statement is also quite typical for the centre-right in that 
it is directly accompanied with an insistence that any credit package is subject to strict 
conditionality.
Conclusion and Research Agenda
In this article, we have called attention to transnational representation as an alternative 
perspective on how to reconcile democratic representation in national parliaments with 
the widening range of politically affected interests due to international interdependencies. 
We have located the notion of transnational representation in the context of the broader 
literature to highlight how it combines insights from the constructivist turn in representa-
tion studies with a focus on national parliaments as well-established sites for political 
representation. We have furthermore argued for two important merits of the notion of 
transnational representation. First, the broader theoretical claim is that transnational rep-
resentation offers a new approach to the challenge of aligning political representation 
with affected interests under conditions of internationalisation. The more specific empiri-
cal claim is that transnational representation offers a tool to analyse how and to what 
extent internationalisation affects representation in national parliaments.
Speaking to the literature on democracy beyond the nation state, we suggest that trans-
national representation points towards a distinct way in which the internationalisation of 
politics can be accommodated by parliamentary politics that does not necessarily rely on 
parliamentary institution-building at the supranational level or on the involvement of 
non-electoral representatives. Instead, relying on our age-old national parliamentary 
institutions, we can imagine national representatives to be drawn into transnational 
debates that serve to create argumentative linkages across national borders. Systematically 
tracking the conditions under which such transnational representation occurs, the effects 
that it has and its legitimacy in the eyes of the foreign affected interests can offer new 
insights into the ability of democratic representation to respond to the internationalisation 
of politics.
To demonstrate the empirical relevance of transnational representation, we have pre-
sented the findings of a case study of representative claims in debates on the EFSF in the 
national parliaments of Germany, Austria and Ireland. The case study demonstrates that 
transnational representation does take place when national parliaments debate about 
issues such as the response to the Eurozone crisis. It illustrates that MPs can make trans-
national claims to quite different effects, most notably both in support and in opposition 
to a proposal. One noteworthy finding is that national parliamentarians often combine 
claims, and hence avoid simply taking a nationalist, a European or a ‘foreign’ side. 
Instead, their deliberate recognition of these different interests suggests that they play an 
active, discursive role in trying to mediate between them. Furthermore, our analysis 
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suggests that transnational representation is more likely to take place in parliaments that 
enjoy greater powers in EU affairs.
The empirical analysis also dispels all too idealistic expectations of transnational rep-
resentation. For sure, there is evidence that transnational representation is more likely to 
be adopted by (left-wing) parties with more internationalist orientations. However, we 
also find that it is a mode of representation that is above all mobilised by the opposition 
against the government and against the proposed EU measures.
The question of the underlying motivation and sincerity is a first direction where trans-
national representation asks for further exploration. It may well be that transnational rep-
resentation is above all a device for the opposition to embarrass the government for the 
effects its proposed policies have on foreign constituencies. Still, transnational represen-
tation is certainly not the exclusive preserve of the opposition, as it is also employed by 
those favouring the proposed policies, albeit to a more limited extent. What is more, even 
if the initial motivation is strategic, that does not undermine the fact that transnational 
representation brings the interests of foreigners into parliamentary debate and forces 
democratic representatives to justify their decisions with reference to them. In that sense, 
the effectiveness of transnational representation in affecting parliamentary debate and 
decision-making is in principle independent of the motivations of its advocates. Indeed, 
in the exchanges between the Left Party and the Greens in the German Bundestag cited 
above, we already saw how transnational representation can become the subject of parlia-
mentary debate. Further research can more systematically look at the reception of trans-
national representation by fellow parliamentarians, the responses it elicits, and its place in 
the overall parliamentary debates.
A related aspect is to further explore the different ways in which transnational repre-
sentation can be linked to forms of political identification that transcend national bounda-
ries. If there are actual transnational political movements – for instance, on the basis of 
class, identity or issues (climate) – parliamentarians that identify with these movements 
can invoke transnational representation to have these interests register in national parlia-
ments. The case above of Die Linke MP Sabine Leidig appealing to the shared interests 
between German and Greek employees appears as an example of this, but such observa-
tions would be even more interesting if we were to find them reciprocated in Greece and 
indeed to be coordinated across a range of parliaments.
Furthermore, the scope of our case study was limited. One would like to examine 
many more parliaments as well as different kinds of policy issues. Obviously, the han-
dling of the Eurozone crisis is a rather specific case as it was highly salient and involved 
distinct redistributive issues across national lines. We do not know whether similar pat-
terns would be found if we turned to regulatory or institutional affairs. Is there, for 
instance, any transnational representation of the distinctive interests of the British people 
in the parliamentary debates on Brexit that are held on the continent? We would also want 
to examine cases that go beyond the EU confines, like EU trade or association agreements 
with third countries, or indeed global agreements like the ones on fighting climate change.
Indeed, while our focus has been on national interactions in the context of European 
cooperation, this kind of analysis can be stretched across multiple levels of political rule. 
One might analyse whether there are members of the European Parliament who identify 
with the interests of third countries. On the other hand, one can also turn to local and 
regional politics to analyse how politicians relate to the interests of other regions affected 
by their decisions. In doing so, one might look for variation between the interests of 
regions within the same state and regions across the national border. Still, we would 
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maintain that the EU context is of particular interest because it is here that we witness a 
major mismatch between greatly increased levels of social and institutional interdepend-
ence while political identification and representation remain mostly concentrated at the 
lower, national level.
In the end, the concept of transnational representation also raises normative questions 
that merit further exploration. Primary among these is the question how the validity and 
legitimacy of the representative claims staked on behalf of foreign interests is to be 
assessed and, more practically, whether within an interdependent polity like the EU, any 
mechanisms could be envisaged to facilitate such assessment. To some extent, these 
observations simply reinforce Saward’s argument that representation is nothing but a 
claim that remains open to contestation, which in principle applies as much to national 
relations of representations as it does to transnational ones. Importantly, however, within 
national polities, the totality of representative claims is eventually subject to the verdict 
of the electorate at the next elections. In contrast, as much as transnational representation 
may promise a mechanism to internalise foreign interests into national parliaments, it 
does not come with any institutional controls. Under these conditions, it is easy enough to 
think of cases in which parliamentarians claim to represent interests beyond their formal 
constituency in ways that are deeply problematic, paternalistic and illegitimate. The 
prime example would be domestic justifications of colonialism, but one can also think of 
examples in the context of humanitarian intervention and development aid. Such exam-
ples underline that anything like transnational representation may eventually remain 
problematic without institutional means for the affected constituency to check and 
respond to the claims made on its behalf.
However, in a world of ever-increasing interdependencies, some sense of responsibil-
ity towards foreign interests, as displayed by transnational representation, is better than 
none at all. What is more, as is also suggested by Saward, the very making of a repre-
sentative claim opens up a platform for political debate; it invites in a way the affected 
constituency into the discussion and gives it a legitimate entry-point into the decision-
making process. Importantly, the quasi-constitutional framework of the EU has some 
characteristics that can help to make transnational representation a more effective and 
legitimate force. While the EU treaties certainly do not guarantee the absence of inter-
state power and the mutual observation of each other’s well-being, they do enshrine the 
permanency of the cooperation, which makes parliaments and their voters well aware that 
they are bound to each other for the long-term. These dynamics are reinforced by the fact 
that all EU member states are democracies and hence allow in principle for the expression 
of a plurality of interests in their domestic decision-making. Thus, even if ‘foreign’ inter-
ests are unlikely to acquire direct access rights in national parliaments, one can envisage 
that transnational representation is reinforced and may, over time, result in some kind of 
democratic ‘conversation’ across parliaments (cf. Weiler, 1996).
Eventually, transnational representation is not going to ‘take over’ in national parlia-
mentary debates, as there is every reason to believe that most MPs will prioritise national 
commitments. Still, even a limited share of transnational claims that invoke the interests 
of foreign peoples literally broadens the debate and is bound to provoke a dialogue 
between national interests and those of others. In that way, transnational representation 
can have a transformative impact on debates in national parliaments, the nature of collec-
tive will-formation and indeed the (self-)understanding of the relevant polity. It thus facil-
itates the alignment of national political processes with the interdependencies created by 
regional cooperation or international cooperation more broadly.
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Notes
1. Quotations in original language, see Online Appendix 2.
2. We conducted intra- and inter-coder reliability tests for unitising and coding (see Online Appendix 4), 
calculating the Holsti coefficient and Krippendorff’s alpha for all variables individually. Both tests exceed 
accepted standards (Krippendorff, 2013; Lombard et al., 2002).
3. At first, this degree of transnationalisation seems at odds with Closa and Maatsch (2014) who do not 
find many references to solidarity with citizens from countries adversely hit by the Eurozone crisis. 
Importantly, however, transnational representation is not only restricted to solidarity claims with foreign 
citizens but also includes references to their (economic) interests.
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